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The role of general causality orientations in the development of goal engagement and adjustment 





A longitudinal study examined individual differences that affect the development of adaptive 
goal regulation capacities in emerging adulthood. Self-determination theory was used to derive 
hierarchical linear models in which autonomous, controlled, and impersonal causality 
orientations differentially predicted baseline levels and rates of yearlong change in three adaptive 
goal regulation outcomes – goal engagement (operationalized as persistence in goal striving), 
goal disengagement capacities, and goal reengagement capacities. University enrolled emerging 
adults reported their levels of the three causality orientations and completed measures of 
persistence, disengagement, and reengagement at the start of the fall term. Goal regulation 
outcomes were assessed again at the start and end of the winter term. Results showed that self-
determination theory is a relevant framework for understanding not only goal engagement, but 
also goal adjustment processes in emerging adulthood. Interestingly, the autonomy orientation, 
which is typically associated with benefits for striving, was negatively related to adaptive goal 
disengagement capacities. Implications for future research on the associations between 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 1985a; Deci & Ryan, 2000) distinguishes 
three broad classes of motivation – autonomous, controlled, and amotivation – that differ in the 
degree to which reasons for motivated behaviors are internalized and integrated with the values, 
beliefs, and intrinsic interests that constitute an individual’s core self (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Autonomous motivation is characterized by deeply volitional, choiceful, and self-endorsed 
reasons for behavior that reflect either intrinsic interests or well-internalized values and 
regulations. Controlled motivation is characterized by pressured reasons for behavior that reflect 
either outright control by externally administered reward or punishment contingencies or by 
contingencies administered by the self, the “shoulds” and “oughts” referred to in SDT as 
introjects.  Amotivation is characterized by a lack of motivation due to individuals’ beliefs that 
they are incompetent, challenges are overwhelming, and the relationship between their efforts 
and important life outcomes is essentially random.  
Over the past 30 years, self-determination theory has contributed much to our 
understanding of how differences in the quality of individuals’ motivation impact their capacity 
for goal engagement, with studies across education, health, and interpersonal domains finding 
that autonomous motivation leads to greater behavioral persistence, effort, progress, and 
attainment than controlled or amotivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000, 2008). To date, however, research 
in the SDT framework has not attempted to explain differences in individuals’ capacities for goal 
adjustment, i.e. capacities to disengage from unattainable goals and reengage in new goals. 
Starting with the publication of a theoretical statement on the putative psychological benefits of 
abandoning unattainable goals (Wrosch et al., 2003a) and amassing a strong body of empirical 
evidence over the last decade, the work of Wrosch and colleagues has extended our 
conceptualization of adaptive self-regulation in goal pursuit to include not only a more nuanced 
view of capacities for goal engagement, but also, critically, capacities to withdraw both effort and 
commitment from goals that have been deemed unattainable or prohibitively costly 
(disengagement) and, ideally, to identify, commit to, and begin pursuit of new goals 
(reengagement).  
Goal adjustment capacities have been linked to a broad array of positive outcomes for 
psychological wellbeing and physical health. Individuals who report less difficulty disengaging 
from unattainable goals and reengaging in new goals report lower levels of depressive symptoms, 
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negative affect, perceived stress, and intrusive thoughts (Wrosch et al., 2003b; Wrosch, Miller, 
Scheier, & Brun de Pontet, 2007; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013) as well as higher levels of purpose 
in life and positive affect (Wrosch, Amir, & Miller, 2011; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). Likewise, 
individuals who disengage and reengage more easily demonstrate more normative patterns in 
daily cortisol secretion, increases in sleep efficiency, and decreases in number of physical health 
problems and levels of systemic inflammation over time (Wrosch et al., 2007; Miller & Wrosch, 
2007). Moreover, the protective effect of goal adjustment capacities on physical health appears to 
be mediated by subjective wellbeing; by reducing psychological distress and fostering purpose in 
life, goal adjustment capacities may reduce individuals’ vulnerability to disease (Wrosch et al., 
2007; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). 
We propose that the quality of individuals’ motivation, as conceptualized by SDT, may 
have important implications not only for goal engagement, but also goal adjustment processes. In 
what follows, we develop a theoretical rationale that explains the ways in which autonomous, 
controlled, and amotivation may be related to goal engagement, disengagement, and 
reengagement processes and provide indirect empirical evidence for these ideas. Then, we report 
results of an empirical study that tested our hypotheses over one academic year in a sample of 
Canadian university students, a particularly appropriate population given that the ability to self-
regulate adaptively in the pursuit of goals during the twenties has important implications for 
success and wellbeing in adulthood (Hill et al., 2011; Howard et al., 2010; Masten et al., 2004; 
Shulman & Nurmi, 2010b). This work a) extends SDT by assessing to what extent it can account 
for the adaptive regulation of unattainable goals, b) simultaneously responds to calls from 
Wrosch and colleagues for research efforts to identify the factors that support the development of 
goal adjustment capacities (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013) and c) contributes to a growing 
literature on psychological processes that propel averages gains in wellbeing across the transition 
to adulthood, a literature that until recently has been predominantly descriptive in nature 
(Shulman & Nurmi, 2010). 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
General Causality Orientations  
Vallerand’s hierarchical model of motivation (Vallerand, 1997, 2007) specifies that 
autonomous and controlled motivation exist at global, contextual, and situational levels. The 
global level reflects motivation at a dispositional level, the contextual level reflects motivation in 
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specific domains (e.g. academics, athletics, relationships), and the situational level reflects 
motivation for specific behaviors (e.g. study for tomorrow’s test, practice the violin this 
afternoon). Within this framework, motivation has a top-down effect such that dispositional 
motivational orientation affects motivation in specific domains, which, in turn, affects motivation 
for specific behaviors (for empirical support for this proposition, see Guay and colleagues (2003), 
Lavigne and Vallerand (2010), Gillet, Gagne, and colleagues (2013), and Gillet, Vallerand, and 
colleagues (2013)). Lee, Sheldon, and Turban (2003) have argued that dispositional motivational 
tendencies should be the starting point for understanding how individuals self-regulate as they 
strive towards goals because they influence perceptions of self and environment across a broad 
spectrum of domains. 
 In SDT, causality orientations reflect different degrees of self-determination at a 
dispositional level (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Rather than characterizing “types” of individuals, the 
three causality orientations are theoretically present to differing degrees in all individuals and 
have been shown to influence context and situation-specific motivation across a variety of life 
domains. Reflecting the highest degree of self-determination, the autonomy orientation is 
characterized by a tendency to interpret events as informational; when an event occurs that has 
the potential to prompt behavior, individuals with a strong autonomy orientation believe they 
have a choice as to the nature of their response and that their response will be competent (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985a). Likewise, the autonomy orientation is characterized by a tendency to seek out, or 
be sensitive to, contexts that support choice and signify competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Last, 
the autonomy orientation is reflected in behavior that is organized around personal beliefs, 
values, and interests and that is more likely to be intrinsically motivated.  
 The autonomy orientation has been linked to a wide variety of positive behavioral, 
affective, and cognitive outcomes. Higher levels of the autonomy orientation are associated with 
greater self-esteem, ego-development, integration in personality, interest, creativity, prosocial 
behavior, and healthy eating habits (Deci & Ryan, 1985a; Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 
1992; Sheldon, 1995; Frederick & Grow, 1996; Gagne, 2003; Gillet, Gagne, et al., 2013). During 
the transition to adulthood, higher levels of the autonomy orientation are associated with an 
informational-identity processing style – the tendency to seek out information and actively 
explore possibilities before making identity commitments (Soenens et al., 2005). Particularly 
relevant to questions regarding goal pursuit, higher levels of the autonomy orientation predict 
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greater work satisfaction, greater commitment to work institutions, more frequent adoption of 
mastery as opposed to performance learning goals, mastery-oriented responses to failure 
feedback, and may protect individuals from the undermining effects of rewards on intrinsic 
motivation (Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994; Lam & Gurland, 2008; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 
2011). Higher levels of the autonomy orientation may predict an increased likelihood of sticking 
to highly challenging self-regulatory commitments, as evidenced by the greater attendance, 
weight loss and weight loss maintenance of more autonomously motivated, severely obese 
individuals involved in a very low calorie weight loss program (Williams et al., 1996). Likewise, 
higher levels of the autonomy orientation are associated with less defensive coping, impression 
management, shame, behavioral disengagement, self-handicapping coping strategies, and self-
derogation, all of which thwart goal engagement (Deci & Ryan, 1985a; Knee & Zuckerman, 
1998; Lewis & Neighbors, 2005).  
 Reflecting a lesser degree of self-determination in behavior, the control orientation 
reflects a tendency to interpret events as controlling; when an event occurs that has the potential 
to prompt behavior, individuals with a strong controlled orientation believe that they have little 
choice as to the nature of their response. Likewise, the control orientation reflects a tendency to 
seek out, or be sensitive to, events and contexts that curtail choice by imposing external 
contingencies (e.g. rewards and punishments) that can organize behavior. It should be noted that 
lack of choice does not necessarily preclude a sense of competence if an individual masters the 
set of contingencies to which they were sensitive to or sought out in a given context (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985a). However, while individuals whose motivation is controlled may, if successful, feel 
effective and competent and be as active and intentional in their pursuit of goals as individuals 
whose motivation is autonomous, the latter theoretically experience themselves as the initiation 
and source of their own behavior while the former do not. This distinction has important 
implications for subjective wellbeing and performance. The control orientation reflects a 
tendency to experience regulatory events as sources of pressure, to rely on external controls, such 
as deadlines, to motivate their behavior, and to place importance in factors like pay and status.   
 Individuals who report higher levels of the control orientation also report higher levels of 
distress, guilt, defensive coping, impression management, public self-consciousness, contingent 
self-esteem, the Type-A coronary prone pattern of pressure, tension, and aggressive achievement, 
and lower levels of ego development (Deci & Ryan, 1985a; Neighbors et al., 2004; Lewis & 
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Neighbors, 2005). Highly controlled emerging adults are more likely to evince a normative 
identity-processing style – a tendency to rely on the prescriptions of authority figures when 
confronted with identity-relevant problems (Soenens et al., 2005). Particularly relevant to goal 
pursuit, individuals who report higher levels of the control orientation also report higher levels of 
work satisfaction, but the magnitude of this association is attenuated relative to that observed 
between the autonomy orientation and work satisfaction (Lam et al., 2008). Such individuals are 
more likely to adopt performance goals over mastery goals, to enroll in less advanced high school 
courses regardless of aptitude, and to perceive a university exam as unfair regardless of their final 
grade (Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994; Wong, 2000; Deci & Ryan, 1985a). 
 Reflecting a lack of self-determination in behavior, the impersonal orientation is 
characterized by a tendency to interpret events as signs of personal incompetence; when an event 
occurs that has the potential to prompt behavior, individuals with high levels of the impersonal 
orientation believe that they are unable to behave in such a way as to achieve desired outcomes 
and, consequently, are likely to experience depressive symptoms related to the present and 
anxious symptoms when entering new situations (Deci & Ryan, 1985).  
 Higher levels of the impersonal orientation have been linked to lower levels of ego 
development and self-esteem, higher levels of negative emotions such as shame, fear, hostility, 
guilt, tension, pressure, and depressive symptoms, and higher levels of self-derogation, public 
self-consciousness, defensive coping, neuroticism, and general negative affect, which appears to 
fully mediate the negative relationship between the impersonal orientation and performance on 
certain cognitive tasks (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Luyckx et al., 2010; Olesen et al., 2010; Gillet et al., 
2013). The higher their endorsement of the impersonal orientation, the less likely emerging adults 
are to have achieved identity commitment, identity integration, or wellbeing that accompanies 
resolution of identity challenges (Luyckx et al., 2010). Aligned with this finding, more 
impersonally oriented individuals demonstrate a diffuse-avoidant identity-processing style when 
facing identity challenges (Soenens et al., 2005). Particularly relevant to goal pursuit, more 
impersonally oriented individuals are similar to highly controlled individuals in that they tend to 
adopt performance as opposed to mastery achievement goals, but while the latter are more likely 
to manage their perceived “performance” by trying to demonstrate competence, the former are 
more likely to manage their “performance” by attempting to avoid public failure (Koestner & 
Zuckerman, 1994). Likewise, more impersonally oriented individuals demonstrate the classic 
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helplessness pattern in achievement settings (i.e. the combination of low self-esteem with 
attempts to avoid failure) and helpless responses to failure feedback (i.e. quitting; Koestner & 
Zuckerman, 1994). In line with these findings, highly impersonally oriented individuals more 
frequently make self-defeating performance attributions and perceive university exams as unfair, 
regardless of their grade (Koestner, 1996; Deci &Ryan, 1985).  
Goal Engagement  
Across major theories of developmental regulation, goal engagement refers to individuals’ 
attempts to achieve the goals that, having been chosen, organize behavior and give meaning and 
purpose to life (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010; Haase, Heckhausen, and Wrosch, 2013). 
Thus, engagement in the pursuit of goals is a primary means through which individuals can 
actively shape their own development across the life course. Recently, Haase and colleagues 
(Haase, Heckhausen, & Wrosch, 2013) offered a theoretical and empirical integration of three 
major theories of developmental regulation: the dual-process model of assimilative and 
accommodative coping (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002), the motivational theory of lifespan 
development (MTD; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010), and the model of selective 
optimization with compensation (SOC; Freund & Baltes, 2002). For the purposes of the current 
study, we summarize the authors’ integration of the aspects of each theory that belong to the goal 
engagement mode in order to present a theoretical background for this construct. Within Haase 
and colleagues’ integrative framework, seven of the eleven regulatory processes highlighted by 
the three theories belong to an overarching goal engagement mode. These are assimilation (dual-
process model), selective primary control, compensatory primary control, and selective 
secondary control (motivational theory of lifespan development), and selection, optimization, and 
compensation (selective optimization with compensation model). In support of this classification, 
results of structural equation modelling demonstrate that each of these processes loads positively 
onto a single second order goal engagement factor (Haase et al., 2013). 
According to the model of assimilative and accommodative coping, assimilation refers to 
attempts by individuals to modify situations or their own behavior in an effort to reduce 
discrepancies between desired and actual developmental outcomes (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 
2002). In this dual-process model, assimilation is both antagonistic and complementary to 
processes of accommodation, which reduce goal-outcome discrepancies via changes to goals 
themselves. The cardinal characteristic of assimilation efforts, whether they are aimed at 
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promotion (e.g. expanding resources and launching future-oriented projects), maintenance of 
functioning, or prevention of loss, is tenacity, especially in the domains that are most central to 
an individual’s self-concept. The extent to which individuals are tenacious in their goal pursuit, in 
turn, is influenced by the importance of goals, individuals’ sense of self-efficacy and beliefs 
about the controllability of outcomes, and the functioning of cognitive biases that focus attention 
on targeted goals and shield pursuers from distraction. 
According to the motivational theory of lifespan development (MTD; Heckhausen, Wrosch, 
& Schulz, 2010), development is adaptive to the extent that individuals achieve control over the 
environment across domains and across the lifespan. To optimize development, individuals can 
engage in primary control striving (e.g. attempts to modify the environment to achieve goals), 
supported by secondary control striving (e.g. attempts to modify the self to expand, maintain, or 
minimize losses in the capacity for primary control). Goal engagement, in this theoretical 
framework, consists of the investment of resources and persistence (selective primary control), 
the mustering of internal, motivational resources, such as imagining the positive consequences of 
achieving goals (selective secondary control), and, when personal resources are insufficient, the 
marshalling of external or alternative resources, such as seeking advice or being fitted for a 
hearing aid (compensatory primary control; Heckhausen et al., 2010). Critically, MTD specifies 
that these goal engagement processes are not adaptive per se, but only to the extent that they 
promote the achievement of goals whose attainment is realistic given available opportunities (e.g. 
goal-opportunity congruence), whose pursuit does not undermine the achievement of other short- 
or long-term goals (management of inter-domain and long-term consequences), and whose 
pursuit does not preclude the maintenance of a minimum diversity of goals, which can protect 
individuals’ sense of self-worth, purpose, and direction when target goals are thwarted. 
Furthermore, MTD specifies that, to maximize primary control capacity, levels of goal 
engagement should emerge, grow, and intensify sharply in synchrony with the emergence, peak, 
and decline of available opportunities for goal achievement (Heckhausen et al., 2010).  
 According to the model of selective optimization with compensation (Baltes, 1987; 
Freund & Baltes, 2002), adaptive management of resources across the lifespan consists of three 
processes. Selection, a goal planning process, refers to choosing which goals to pursue and 
committing resources to their achievement. When goals represent desired end states, selection is 
elective. However, when individuals reorganize their goal structure and choose new goals as a 
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result of losing the means to pursue a previously prioritized goal, selection is said to be loss-
based, which can support engagement through freeing resources for active goals, or 
disengagement, through reorganization. Optimization, a set of goal pursuit processes, refers to 
acquiring, applying, and refining the means – the skills and resources - necessary for goal 
achievement. The SOC model emphasizes that choosing appropriate means depends on an 
accurate understanding of the goal domain (e.g. musical performance vs. effective parenting) and 
the opportunities made available within individuals’ socio-cultural contexts. Optimization may 
include straightforward investments of time, effort, and resources, but also persistence in the face 
of obstacles and increases in the level of goal-related effort when the chances of success are less 
likely. Last, compensation refers to using alternative means – whether external (e.g. a technology 
such as a prosthesis) or internal (e.g. a memory aid such as a mnemonic device) to maintain or 
regain functioning when previously employed strategies are no longer available.  
 Despite differences, which perhaps are owing to diverging fundamental assumptions 
about the purpose of regulation across the lifespan (Haase et al., 2013), there is a considerable 
amount of theoretical overlap between the goal engagement processes specified by these three 
theories. Effort and persistence in the face of obstacles are a common thread, as is the importance 
of developmental and socio-cultural context (e.g. contextually determined beliefs about 
controllability in the dual-process model, goal-opportunity congruence in MTL, and appropriate 
choice of means in the SOC model). Likewise, empirical evidence associated with goal 
engagement processes from each theory converges on findings suggesting that goal engagement 
processes confer benefits for successful development and subjective wellbeing across the 
lifespan. For example, Haase, Heckhausen, and Koller (2008) reported that control striving 
during the transition to adulthood was associated with securing sought-after training positions 
among female adolescents and with positive affect among both females and males. Likewise, the 
components of the SOC model have been shown to be positively associated with each indicator 
assessed by Ryff’s (1989) original inventory of wellbeing (Freund & Baltes, 2002). Finally, 
tenacity in goal pursuit has been linked with greater life satisfaction, stronger perceived locus of 
control, and lower levels of depressive symptoms among adults and older adults (Brandtstädter & 
Renner, 1990; Bailly et al., 2012). 
 It should be noted that each of these theoretical approaches to developmental regulation 
includes formulations not only about the goal engagement mode, but also about the goal 
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disengagement mode and its set of functional and temporal relationships to engagement 
processes. However, the purpose of the present study is to extend SDT’s theoretical framework 
beyond goal engagement to goal adjustment as conceptualized by Wrosch and colleagues. 
Hereafter, therefore, we focus our review of goal adjustment capacities (e.g. disengagement and 
reengagement) to theoretical and empirical evidence associated with this latter framework. 
Goal Adjustment  
 A relatively common phenomenon (Bauer, 2004), unattainable goals are those that 
individuals cannot achieve due to lack of skill, social, developmental, biological, or genetic 
constraints, or unresolvable conflicts with other, more important goals (Wrosch et al., 2003a; 
Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Goal adjustment capacities reflect reliable individual 
differences in the ease with which individuals adjust to unattainable goals and, therefore, their 
ability to minimize the negative consequences associated with confronting failure and the 
thwarting of aspirations (Wrosch et al., 2003b, 2007a). Disengagement capacities reflect 
individual differences in the ease with which individuals can withdraw both effort and 
commitment from goals that have been deemed unattainable or prohibitively costly (Wrosch et 
al., 2003b). Withdrawal of effort is reflected in the scaling back or cessation of behavioral efforts 
to attain goals, while withdrawal of commitment requires the redefinition of the goal as no longer 
necessary for satisfaction in life and, hence, less important than it was. Disengagement is 
considered an essential aspect of self-regulation because all individuals, at one time or another, 
will face an insurmountable problem – an objective failure or the realization that continued goal 
pursuit will drain resources and distract from necessary or more important goals. In contrast, 
reengagement capacities reflect individual differences in the ease with which individuals 
identify, commit to, and begin pursuing meaningful alternative goals following disengagement 
(Wrosch et al., 2003b). Research in the goal adjustment framework has shown that goal 
disengagement and reengagement capacities are typically weakly related or unrelated, supporting 
the hypothesis that they represent independent self-regulation constructs (Wrosch, Scheier, & 
Miller, 2013). These adaptive capacities appear to increase across the lifespan from adolescence 
to old age (Wrosch et al., 2003b; Wrosch & Miller, 2009) and to impact quality of life across 
multiple domains (for a review, see Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). 
 Wrosch and colleagues have developed a theoretical model that specifies the specific 
primary and secondary functions of goal disengagement and reengagement capacities and their 
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effects on individuals’ health and wellbeing (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). According to this 
model, the primary function of goal disengagement capacities is to reduce the distress associated 
with repeated failures (e.g. negative affect and depressive symptoms), which, through effects on 
the endocrine and immune systems, can improve physiological functioning and reduce 
vulnerability to disease. In contrast, the primary function of reengagement capacities is to 
increase individuals’ sense of purpose in life and positive affect, which, in turn, translate into 
benefits for their physiological health. In that disengagement frees individuals’ resources, 
disengagement may also contribute to increases in positive indicators of wellbeing by facilitating 
reengagement. By promoting purpose in life and positive affect, reengagement, in turn, may 
make it easier for individuals to come to terms with unattainable goals, disengage, and reduce 
their distress. Finally, both disengagement and reengagement capacities may exert direct effects 
on physical health. For example, abandoning a futile goal may result in an immediate decrease in 
stress and reengagement may result in immediate improvements in conditioning if new goals 
promote healthy behaviors, such as exercise (Wrosch, Sheier, & Miller, 2013). 
 Empirical evidence accumulated over the past decade provides strong support for this 
model (for a review of empirical studies, see Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Research has 
linked disengagement capacities with lower levels of various negative indicators of wellbeing, 
including depressive symptoms, negative affect, perceived stress, and intrusive thoughts, as well 
as a lower number of physical health problems and more normative daily secretion of the stress 
hormone cortisol (Wrosch et al., 2003b; Wrosch et al., 2007; Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013). 
Likewise, longitudinal evidence shows that absolute levels or increases in disengagement 
capacities lead to decreases in depressive symptoms over time (Wrosch & Miller, 2007), playing 
a protective role among individuals who confront stressors that are particularly likely to constrain 
their goal pursuits (e.g. older adults experiencing increases in functional disability; Dunne, 
Wrosch, & Miller, 2011; individuals caring for a family member with a mental illness; Wrosch et 
al., 2011). Disengagement capacities also predicted fewer physical health problems and improved 
sleep efficiency in college students across one semester (Wrosch et al., 2007) and declines in 
levels of C-Reactive Protein, a physiological indicator of systemic inflammation associated with 
long-term health risks, over one year in a sample of adolescent girls (Miller & Wrosch, 2007). 
 A more limited body of evidence exists to support the model’s hypothesized effects of 
goal reengagement capacities on positive indicators of subjective wellbeing and physical health. 
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In line with the hypothesized primary function of goal reengagement capacities, tendencies to 
identify, commit to, and begin pursuit of new goals have been linked to greater positive affect 
(Wrosch & Sabiston, 2013) and purpose in life (Wrosch et al., 2011). Likewise, the findings that 
reengagement capacities are associated with lower levels of perceived stress (Wrosch, et al., 
2007) and suicidal thinking (O’Connor & Forgan) and buffer the effects of caregiver burden on 
depressive symptoms (Wrosch et al., 2011) support their hypothesized secondary function.  
Recently, evidence has emerged that reengagement may be a “double-edged sword,” 
adaptive when it renews individuals’ sense of purpose but detrimental to wellbeing when it 
depletes resources that are needed elsewhere (Wrosch et al., 2011; Wrosch, Rueggeberg, & 
Hoffman, 2013; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Which side of the sword reengagement 
represents likely depends on the nature of the new goal an individual selects. In the case of a 
chronically stressful situation, like caring for a chronically ill family member, the emotional and 
physiological benefits of disengaging from personal career goals may be undermined if the 
individual chooses to reinvest in ambitious, resource-intensive social or leisure goals (Wrosch et 
al., 2011). Given that goal adjustment theorists are just beginning to explore the distinction 
between more and less adaptive reengagement processes and given the exploratory nature of the 
present study, we do not distinguish here between more and less adaptive forms of reengagement. 
Emerging Adulthood 
To date, SDT has not explicitly explored the implications of motivational orientation for 
goal pursuit during emerging adulthood (EA; Arnett, 2000, 2004). A culturally sanctioned period 
of unprecedented freedom for people aged roughly 18-29 years, EA has evolved over the past 
five decades due to social and economic changes in industrialized societies internationally, 
allowing young men and women time to explore different paths and experiences before taking on 
the responsibilities of traditional adult roles. Characterized by a) exploration in school, work, and 
intimate relationships, b) instability in these domains as a result of exploration, c) self-focus, d) 
feeling “in-between” adolescence and adulthood, and e) feeling a sense of possibility and 
opportunity for the future, EA provides a meaningful context for the investigation of hypotheses 
concerning motivation and self-regulation of goals. Theories of personality change emphasize 
that times of role transition, like EA, function as spurs to change in dispositional characteristics 
(Elder, Modell, & Parke, 1994; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). In support of 
this view, a meta-analyses of personality trait change in adulthood revealed that more mean-level 
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change in personality occurs during the twenties than during any other lifespan phase (Roberts, 
Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Thus, we may be more likely to “catch” individuals in the process 
of personality change during the decade of the twenties than in earlier or later decades.  
Second, we may be more likely to observe the effects of motivational orientations during 
the twenties than in earlier or later decades. Relative to adolescence, in which institutional and 
parental authority constrains choice, and adulthood, in which the responsibilities of work and 
family do likewise, emerging adulthood is a time of relative freedom of action. This freedom may 
facilitate a clearer expression of individuals’ motivational tendencies than earlier or later decades. 
This hypothesis is supported by the work of Ratelle and colleagues (2007) who observed a 
naturally occurring “high autonomy” motivational profile among individuals on the threshold of 
emerging adulthood (mean age = 18.58), but not among individuals just a few years younger, 
suggesting that high school students’ autonomous motivation may be suppressed by a raft of 
factors - grades, deadlines, lack of choice, and surveillance – that are not as salient in higher 
education contexts.  
Finally, EA is a lifespan phase in which adaptive self-regulation of goals is 
simultaneously critical for success and wellbeing in later adulthood (Hill et al., 2011; Howard et 
al., 2010; Masten et al., 2004; Shulman & Nurmi, 2010b) and challenging; overall, young adults 
report more difficulty disengaging from unattainable goals than older adults (Wrosch et al., 
2003b). Emerging adults, particularly those enrolled in university, may experience an abrupt 
increase in unattainable goals by virtue of tougher standards for achievement in domains such as 
academics, athletics, and the arts (Rasmussen et al., 2006). Given the importance and challenge 
associated with goal striving during this lifespan phase, EA provides an appropriate context for a 
first investigation of the relationships between different degrees of self-determination and 
adaptive goal engagement and adjustment processes. 
Associations between general causality orientations and goal engagement and adjustment 
capacities in emerging adulthood 
 Goal engagement. Goal engagement was operationalized in the current study via a 
measure of persistence in goal striving because persistence appears as a key feature of the 
engagement mode across major theories of lifespan regulation (Haase et al., 2013). We 
hypothesized that the autonomy orientation would be positively related to baseline levels and 
growth in persistence among university-enrolled emerging adults over one academic year. A 
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strong autonomy orientation is characterized by the tendency to organize behavior according to 
personal values and interests and to report autonomous reasons for specific behaviors. When a 
chosen goal reflects an individual’s internalized values and intrinsic interests, that individual 
should experience fewer challenges to the commitment of time, energy, and resources to the 
pursuit of that goal and, consequently, demonstrate greater persistence. Supporting this 
hypothesis, several studies of motivation and performance in the academic domain have 
demonstrated that autonomous motivation leads to better outcomes through sustained effort 
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1998), study effort (Vansteenkiste et al., 2005), and deep study strategy 
(Kusurkar et al., 2013). Indeed, for autonomously motivated individuals, the behavioral efforts 
that are synonymous with persistence may be experienced as pleasurable, as suggested by the 
finding that positive affect fully mediates the positive association between autonomous 
motivation for a cognitive task and performance on that task (Gillet et al., 2013).  These efforts 
may even be experienced as flow when the individual’s skill level matches the level of challenge 
inherent in his or her pursuit (Nakamura & Csíkszentmihályi, 2001); experience sampling data 
indicate that higher levels of the autonomy orientation are indeed associated with a greater 
percentage of flow experienced while doing school work among high school students (Wong et 
al., 2000).  
Moreover, the autonomy orientation may protect individuals’ intrinsic motivation, and 
thus persistence, for goal pursuits when environmental events threaten to undermine it. Classical 
SDT studies on the undermining effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971, 1972) 
and subsequent meta-analyses (e.g. Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) have established that 
individuals are less likely to persist in intrinsically motivating activities after they have been 
offered a reward for doing the activity. Follow-up studies identified a host of other environmental 
events, such as deadlines, surveillance, threats, and negative or controlling positive feedback, that 
undermine intrinsic motivation and, thus, persistence (for a review, see Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
Decades after these early studies, Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2011) extended the original 
findings by demonstrating that the autonomous causality orientation can temper the undermining 
effects of rewards on intrinsically motivated persistence. In their study, whereas more controlled 
individuals displayed the classic pattern of persisting less when they had been rewarded than 
when they had not, more autonomously oriented individuals tended to persist at the same level 
regardless of reward condition. This finding points to the possibility that high levels of the 
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autonomy orientation may protect intrinsically motivated persistence not only from rewards, but 
from some or all of the other factors identified as threats to intrinsic motivation, all of which are 
likely to be encountered during the course of goal pursuit in the university context.  
 Likewise, we hypothesized that the control orientation would be positively related to 
baseline levels and growth in persistence over the academic year. Like autonomy, the control 
orientation is goal-oriented. For example, experience sampling evidence suggests that the control 
orientation is related to alertness, activity, and a longer amount of time spent doing schoolwork 
among high school girls (Wong, 2000). However, we expected that the positive relationship 
between the control orientation and persistence would be weaker than the relationship between 
the autonomy orientation and persistence. Although both motivational orientations reflect an 
orientation toward achieving goals, the control orientation is distinguished by its focus on gaining 
the approval of authority figures and satisfying social pressures and standards. Lee, Sheldon, and 
Turner (2003), building on the work of Koestner and Zuckerman (1994), have shown that the 
control orientation promotes the adoption of one of two types of performance goals – 
performance-approach or performance-avoidance goals – depending on an individual’s level of 
self-confidence. Self-confident individuals with high levels of the control orientation seek 
opportunities to prove their competence and display their abilities to those in a position to grant 
approval and rewards. Such individuals tend to adopt more difficult goals, again as a function of 
their self-confidence. These findings constitute indirect evidence that high levels of the control 
orientation, when paired with self-confidence, should promote persistence in goal striving as 
conceptualized by Wrosch and colleagues. Individuals with high levels of the control orientation 
who lack self-confidence, however, are more likely to attempt to manage their self-image by 
avoiding failure and hiding perceived incompetence from evaluators and, to this end, to adopt 
less difficult goals. These findings suggest that high levels of the control orientation, when paired 
with a lack of self-confidence, should hinder persistence in goal striving. Because we were 
focused on the main and interactive effects of the general causality orientations themselves in the 
present study, we did not distinguish between high levels of the control orientation paired with 
high vs. low self-confidence. Therefore, we expected the observed relationship between the 
control orientation and persistence to reflect both types of achievement goal patterns – 
performance-approach and performance-avoidance – and therefore to be weaker than the 
relationship of autonomy to persistence.  
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Finally, we expected that impersonal orientation would be negatively related to baseline 
levels of persistence, as well as declines over the academic year, because the impersonal 
orientation reflects a fundamental mistrust in the individual’s ability to control outcomes in his or 
her life. 
 Goal disengagement and autonomy orientation. SDT has demonstrated that 
autonomous motivation is an asset in promoting cognitions, affects, and behaviors that support 
goal striving across a wide variety of domains. Thus, it would be tempting to hypothesize that the 
autonomy orientation also promotes adaptive self-regulation of unattainable goals, on the grounds 
that autonomy is generally associated with more positive self-regulatory outcomes and the 
capacity for disengagement, with its theoretical and empirical links to psychological and physical 
wellbeing, is such an outcome. However, application of the principles of SDT and evaluation of 
available empirical literature relevant to this question yield two competing hypotheses about the 
relationship of autonomy to disengagement, one of which is that autonomy, generally considered 
a panacea for mental health and flourishing, may hinder the development of disengagement 
capacities. Ironically, both arguments rest on the tendency of autonomously oriented individuals 
to demonstrate deeper, mindful engagement in their actions than controlled or impersonally 
motivated individuals.  
 First, we present the argument, in line with SDT’s familiar conclusion that autonomy is 
generally associated with more positive outcomes, that the autonomy orientation supports the 
development of disengagement capacities in emerging adulthood. This argument is based on the 
work of Legault and Inzlicht (2013), who have proposed that autonomy at the dispositional level 
should promote adaptive self-regulation in goal pursuit by increasing individuals’ attention, 
receptivity, and emotional reaction to threatening self-relevant information, specifically self-
regulatory failures. The greater salience of failure, they argue, and the ability of more 
autonomously oriented individuals to cope with failure in a non-defensive manner, is a critical 
adaptation that allows them to “slow down, recalibrate their behavior, and ultimately improve 
their performance (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013).” Empirical support for their position derives from 
findings that autonomy is associated with less defensive coping strategies (Knee & Zuckerman, 
1998), fewer self-protective attributions after failure (Knee & Zuckerman, 1996), and integration 
of mistakes and personal faults (Weinstein et al., 2011). Across studies, the autonomy orientation 
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appears to be associated with less defensiveness than the control orientation (for a review, see 
Hodgins & Knee, 2002).  
Like other researchers who have based models of self-regulation on self-determination 
theory, Legault and Inzlicht do not make predictions about unattainable goals, specifically. 
Rather, their research question centers on whether higher levels of the autonomy orientation are 
associated with increased reactivity to self-regulation failure on a classic inhibition task, the 
Stroop Task. Moreover, their level of analysis – the error-related negativity (ERN) an event-
related potential arising in the anterior cingulate cortex – is a distal antecedent to the behavioral 
and motivational responses that characterize disengagement. Nevertheless, we propose that their 
argument can be extended to apply not only to self-regulatory failure in the moment-to-moment 
course of goal pursuit, but also to self-regulatory failures – i.e. unattainable goals – regarding 
which further effort would be futile. Autonomous motivation, reflected in “deep, mindful 
engagement” in goal striving, may, through non-defensive coping and receptivity to self-
threatening information, also help individuals to slow down, recalibrate their behavior, and walk 
away from goals whose continued pursuit would expose them to repeated experiences of failure 
and deplete resources that could be applied to the pursuit of other, or new, goals.  
 A second line of reasoning supporting an autonomy-disengagement link integrates one 
proposition from Nesse’s (2000) evolutionary perspective on the adaptive function of depressive 
symptoms and one speculation from self-determination theory. Through the process of natural 
selection, depressive symptoms (e.g. low mood as distinguished from the clinical syndrome) may 
have been selected for because they facilitate individuals’ disengagement from unattainable goals 
by signaling that current pursuits are not proceeding as planned. In support of Nesse’s thesis, 
Wrosch and Miller (2007) reported that depressive symptoms predicted increases in goal 
disengagement capacities over one year in a sample of adolescent girls at high risk for 
depression. Moreover, although disengagement capacities increased on average in their sample, 
girls who had the highest baseline levels of depressive symptoms experienced steeper increases in 
disengagement capacities than those who reported the lowest levels of baseline depression.  
 From a self-determination perspective, the autonomy orientation may predispose 
individuals to a greater degree of anguish vis-à-vis goal failure than the control or impersonal 
orientations because of the relative depth of internalization and self-identification characteristic 
of autonomously motivated goals (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). In sum, if the autonomy orientation 
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differentially predisposes individuals to distress in the face of goal failure, and such symptoms 
facilitate disengagement, then the autonomy orientation may exert an indirect effect on 
disengagement through depressive symptoms and low mood when goals are unattainable. 
 Next, we present the argument, which challenges the consensus within self-determination 
theory that autonomous motivation is universally adaptive, that the autonomy orientation thwarts 
the development of disengagement capacities. This argument is based on the rationale of Wrosch 
and colleagues, who speculate that it might be harder for individuals to disengage from more 
important than from less important goals (Wrosch, Scheier, Carver et al., 2003). These authors 
define goal importance with reference to Carver and Scheier’s well-known hierarchical model of 
the self-regulation of goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998). In this model, an individual’s most abstract 
goals, (“Be” goals, e.g. “Be a good mother”) are tightly linked to, perhaps even direct 
manifestations of the individual’s sense of self. Goals at this level influence goals at the next 
level down (“Do” goals, e.g. “Spend quality time with my child”), which, in turn, organize goals 
at increasingly concrete, specific, and ultimately motor levels (“Wake up early to spend the 
morning with my son; Set my alarm clock for 7:30am; Press the reset button on the alarm 
clock”).  
 According to this model, a goal is as important as the strength of its vertical connection to 
goals at higher levels of the hierarchy, and, ultimately, to the individual’s sense of self. Further, 
goals at lower, more concrete levels of the hierarchy may be more important than other goals at 
the same level if they are more tightly linked to higher-order goals.  
 What do self-determination and the autonomy orientation have to do with the hierarchical 
model of self-regulation? We suggest that the very goals that are important in the hierarchical 
model by virtue of their vertical coherence with an individual’s sense of self are likely to be those 
that are autonomously motivated. Recall that the autonomy orientation reflects a tendency to 
organize behavior according to the beliefs, values, and interests that have been well-internalized 
and integrated with the individual’s self. If, as Wrosch and colleagues propose, it is generally 
harder to disengage from a more important vs. a less important goal, and autonomously 
motivated goals can be viewed as important according to the same criteria, then it should be 
harder to disengage from a more autonomously motivated than a less autonomously motivated or 
a controlled goal. Indeed, experience sampling evidence suggests that the autonomy orientation is 
associated with engagement with academic activities considered important to self, while the 
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control orientation is associated with engagement in academic activities considered important to 
others (Wong, 2000). 
 Goal disengagement and control orientation. We expected that the control orientation 
would be negatively related to disengagement capacities because of the link between the control 
orientation and contingent self-esteem, or the dependency of self-worth on success in important 
domains (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Hodgins et al., 2007). When self-esteem is contingent, the boost to 
self-worth occasioned by success is transitory, rendering each challenge a new, conclusive test of 
self-worth. To highly controlled individuals, facing an unattainable goal presumably poses a 
serious threat to self-esteem. The desire to protect self-esteem may motivate such individuals to 
persist in futile efforts to achieve goals or, even once behavioral efforts have been abandoned, to 
remain psychologically committed to goals, exposing them to repeated failure experiences and 
depleting behavioral and motivational resources that could be fruitfully invested elsewhere.  
 Goal disengagement and impersonal orientation. We expected that the impersonal 
orientation would be positively related to disengagement capacities because of the association 
between the impersonal orientation and depressive symptoms (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Wrosch and 
colleagues have argued that depressive symptoms may facilitate adaptive disengagement from 
unattainable or prohibitively costly goals because low mood may enable individuals to evaluate 
the costs of continued, futile goal pursuit more objectively. Consistent with their hypotheses, 
Wrosch and Miller observed that depressive symptoms predicted increases in disengagement and 
reengagement capacities, which in turn predicted subsequent decreases in overall depressive 
symptoms in a sample of adolescent girls (Wrosch & Miller, 2009). Findings from this study 
suggest that the impersonal orientation, though a hindrance to the adaptive self-regulation of 
personal goals in other respects, may through the tendency to experience low mood facilitate 
adaptive disengagement when goals are, in fact, unattainable. 
 Goal reengagement and autonomy orientation. We expected the autonomy orientation 
to be positively related to baseline levels and yearlong growth in reengagement capacities. 
Individuals who reengage are likely to choose a new goal that compliments or expresses a core 
aspect of the self (Wrosch et al., 2003a). Because the autonomy orientation is associated with 
greater ego development, self-actualization (Deci & Ryan, 1985a), integration in personality 
(Koestner et al., 1992), and the organization of actions according to self-endorsed beliefs, values, 
19 
 
and interests, individuals with stronger autonomy orientations are likely to have an easier time 
identifying, committing to, and beginning to pursue alternative goals.  
 Goal reengagement and control orientation. We expected the control orientation to be 
unrelated to baseline levels or the yearlong growth trajectory for reengagement because the 
control orientation is characterized by reliance on external norms and authority figures to 
organize action. This hypothesis is founded on the insight of Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 
Cote, & Arnett, 2005), who observed that outcomes associated with controlled motivation can be 
difficult to predict because controlled individuals rely on the environment for direction. Their 
argument, we propose, generalizes to reengagement processes. When, following disengagement, 
clear directives and contingencies vis-à-vis new goals are available, individuals with a strong 
controlled orientation may reengage in a goal whose pursuit or achievement is likely to result in 
reward or approval. If, on the other hand, clear directives and contingencies for reengagement 
following disengagement are absent, individuals with a strong control orientation will lack the 
environmental cues that typically shape their goal selection and pursuit, resulting in difficulty 
with reengagement. Since reengagement outcomes for individuals with a strong control 
orientation are likely to depend more heavily on environmental cues and events than 
reengagement outcomes for more autonomously oriented individuals, it is difficult to predict a 
clear relationship in one direction or the other.  
 Goal reengagement and impersonal orientation. Finally, we expected the impersonal 
orientation to be negatively related to baseline levels of and declines in reengagement capacities 
over the academic year. Whereas the impersonal orientation may, through its association with 
depressive symptoms, support disengagement processes, it is unlikely to help individuals 
identify, commit to, or begin pursuing alternative goals. Emerging adults who report high levels 
of the impersonal orientation are less likely to have achieved the identity commitment and 
integration that could help individuals to select from an array of possible goals. Impersonally 
oriented individuals are more likely to believe that they cannot control important outcomes in 
their lives, rendering them less likely to make commitments to new goals, as goal commitment 
implies a belief that the goal is achievable. Even if an individual manages to identify and commit 
to a new goal, the negative affectivity associated with the impersonal orientation across studies is 
likely to interfere with his or her ability to initiate behavioral efforts towards achieving the goal. 
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Instead, highly impersonally oriented individuals are more likely to focus on unattainable goals 
as further proofs of their incompetence and ineffectance. 
Joint effects of causality orientations in emerging adulthood. Given that each causality 
orientation is theoretically present to some degree in each individual (Deci & Ryan, 1985a), 
surprisingly few researchers have investigated interactive effects among the autonomy, control, 
and impersonal orientations (for exceptions see Knee and Zuckerman, 1998, Wong, 2000. 
Instead, researchers typically classify individuals into predominantly autonomous, controlled, or 
impersonal groups on the grounds that the strongest orientation will exert the greatest effects on 
behavior and subjective experience (e.g. Koestner et al., 1992); Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994), 
Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2011) or by classifying individuals into forced (e.g. Knee & 
Zuckerman, 1996) or naturally occurring (e.g. Ratelle et al., 2007) motivational profiles 
characterized by high or low levels of each causality orientation.  
 Although findings from the aforementioned studies have been illustrative, we argue that 
contemporary research on causality orientations should investigate formal moderation effects 
between the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations on self-regulation outcomes. Given 
that they are theoretically present to differing degrees within each individual, it may be that 
causality orientations have important joint effects on relevant cognitions, affects, and behaviors. 
Such research is justified, in part, by the limited but intriguing findings that have been reported. 
For example, Wong (2000) found that the autonomy and control orientations interacted to predict 
whether students enrolled in more or less advanced high school courses. High levels of the 
controlled orientation predicted enrollment in less advanced courses, but this effect disappeared 
when levels of the autonomous orientation were also high (Wong, 2000), suggesting that the 
tendency to organize behavior according to well-internalized and integrated beliefs, values, and 
interests may protect individuals who are simultaneously sensitive to external pressure and 
control from making self-limiting choices.  
How might causality orientations interact to predict goal adjustment outcomes? One 
possibility is that high levels of the impersonal orientation operating jointly with high levels of 
either the autonomy or control orientation may, through the tendency to believe in personal 
incompetence, help individuals to disengage from unattainable goals. Furthermore, causality 
orientations may interact to predict which individuals display the most adaptive sequence of goal 
adjustment processes, e.g. disengagement followed by reengagement in alternative goals that 
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provide purpose in life without spreading individuals’ resources “too thin.” Given the lack of 
theoretical or empirical evidence for the effects of interactions among causality orientations on 
the self-regulation of goals, we do not make specific hypotheses concerning these effects. Rather, 
we include joint effects of the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations on each self-
regulatory outcome as exploratory analyses that are meant to advance theory and stimulate 
empirical work. 
Current Study: Summary and Hypotheses 
To date, SDT has not adequately addressed the phenomenon of unattainable goals nor 
specific goal adjustment processes (e.g. disengagement and reengagement) that help individuals 
to self-regulate effectively when, inevitably, they face failure in goal pursuit and the thwarting of 
aspirations. To fill this gap in the literature, the current study proposes specific hypotheses 
concerning the ways in which distinct motivational orientations as conceptualized within SDT 
relate to absolute levels of and change in not only goal engagement, but also goal adjustment 
capacities. These hypotheses are tested in the developmental context of emerging adulthood, a 
phase of the lifespan in which the interplay between motivation, striving, and change at the 
dispositional level may have important implications for later adult outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  
The autonomy orientation is positively related to both baseline levels and yearlong growth in 
self-reported persistence in goal striving. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: 
The control orientation is positively related to both baseline levels and yearlong growth in 
persistence. The magnitude of both relationships is attenuated relative to the magnitude of the 
relationships observed between the autonomy orientation and persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: 
The impersonal orientation is negatively related to baseline levels of persistence and predicts 
declines in persistence over the academic year. 
 
Hypothesis 2a1:  
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The autonomy orientation is positively related to baseline levels and yearlong growth in 
disengagement capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 2a2:  
The autonomy orientation is negatively related to baseline levels and predicts yearlong declines 
in disengagement capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: 
The control orientation is negatively related to baseline levels and predicts yearlong declines in 
disengagement capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 2c:  
The impersonal orientation is positively related to baseline levels and predicts yearlong increases 
in disengagement capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: 




The control orientation is unrelated to baseline levels or yearlong trajectory for reengagement 
capacities. 
 
Hypothesis 3c:  
The impersonal orientation is negatively related to baseline levels and predicts declines in 
reengagement capacities. 
 
Chapter 3: Methods 
Participants and Procedures 
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 Potential participants were recruited by volunteer research assistants at start-of-term fall 
events and by fliers posted around the university campus where the study took place. Individuals 
who indicated their interest by providing contact information on sign-up sheets or by contacting 
the research team directly were sent an email that described the study, offered a gift card to one 
of three popular retailers in exchange for participation, and provided a link to an online survey. 
Data collection for the study proceeded over four waves spanning the academic year. At each 
wave, participants who had at least partially completed one or more previous online surveys were 
contacted via email and invited to complete a new survey, each of which required participants to 
indicate that they understood the purpose, potential risks, and potential benefits of the study, 
indicate their free and informed consent, and indicate that they were between the ages of 18 and 
25 years and enrolled in their first university degree program. Reminder emails were sent one and 
two weeks following the initial contact and data collection closed approximately one month 
following the initial recruitment email at each wave.  
The final sample (N = 298, 78.9% female) for the present study included those who 
completed at least the demographic characteristics section and first questionnaire of the online 
survey at Wave 1. Participants in this sample ranged in age from 18 to 25 years (M = 20.88, SD = 
1.74), predominantly identified themselves as Caucasian (74.2% Caucasian; 8.7% Asian; 6.7% 
Black; 8.7% Biracial), and were relatively evenly spread over the first (24.8%), second (31.2%), 
third (27.5%), and fourth (11.7%) years of university study (3.3% were in their fifth year or 
beyond). Though a slight majority (53.7%) reported living at home with their parents, a variety of 
living situations were reported (25% with other students; 7% with non-student roommates; 10% 
with a spouse; 3.4% with non-parent relatives; 7.4% alone). Participants also reported a range of 
family incomes, with the greatest proportion (19%) reporting annual family income between 
$50,000.00 and $75,000.00 CAD (min = 8% at or below $25,000.00, max = 9.7% between $125 
and $200,000.00). Approximately 21% of participants reported that they did not know their 
family income. Seventy-five percent of participants’ mothers and 75.6% of participants’ fathers 
had completed two-year (college), four-year (university), or higher education degrees.  
Individuals who completed the baseline assessment (start of fall term) were invited via 
email to participate at three additional data collection points (end of fall term, start of winter 
term, and end of winter term) over the course of the year. The present study analyzed data from 
the first, third, and fourth data collection points when data on goal regulation outcomes were 
24 
 
collected. Times of measurement are hereafter referred to as the baseline assessment/Wave 1, 
Wave 2, and Wave 3.  
Measures 
General causality orientations. General causality orientations were measured with the 
12-vignette version of the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS; Deci & Ryan, 1985a). 
This version of the GCOS presents 12 vignettes describing common social or achievement 
situations, each of which is followed by three possible responses that reflect, respectively, a 
response consistent with the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations. Using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (anchored at 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely), respondents rate how typical 
each of the three responses is for them. Responses to items consistent with each orientation are 
summed across the vignettes to create three independent subscales - the autonomy, control, and 
impersonal subscales. The GCOS is a well-validated self-report measure of individual differences 
in relatively enduring motivational tendencies (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Internal consistency 
reliability for the subscales of the GCOS were satisfactory in the present sample (α =.74 
(Autonomy); α = .69 (Control); α =.77 (Impersonal)).  
Goal engagement. Goal engagement was operationalized in the current study via a 
measure of persistence in goal striving because persistence appears as a key feature of the 
engagement mode across major theories of lifespan regulation (Haase et al., 2013). Persistence 
was measured with a 5-item self-report instrument adapted from Wrosch, Heckhausen, and 
Lachman (2000; e.g. “When I encounter problems, I don’t give up until I solve them”). Using a 
4-point Likert scale (anchored at 1 = not at all, 4 = a lot), respondents rate the degree to which 
each item describes them. Higher scores on a sum total of the items indicate higher levels of the 
underlying construct. Evidence for the validity of this scale derives from Wrosch and colleagues 
(2000) study, in which persistence in goal striving was associated with mastery beliefs. Internal 
consistency reliability for the persistence in goal striving scale was satisfactory across the three 
waves of the study (α = .82 to .84). 
Goal adjustment capacities. Goal adjustment capacities were measured with the 10-item 
Goal Adjustment Scale (GAS; Wrosch et al., 2003b) a well-validated instrument that assesses 
individual differences in goal adjustment capacities. The GAS contains two independent 
subscales, the 4-item goal disengagement subscale and the 6-item goal reengagement subscale. 
The goal disengagement subscale assesses the strength of an individual’s tendency to reduce 
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effort and relinquish commitment towards unattainable or prohibitively costly goals. Two items 
assess the former (e.g. “It’s easy for me to reduce my effort toward the goal”) and two the latter 
(e.g. “If I stay committed to the goal for a long time, I can’t let it go” (reverse-scored). 
Respondents indicate the degree to which these statements describe their tendencies using a 5-
point Likert scale (anchored at 1 = almost always true, 5 = almost never true). The average of 
ratings across items indicates the strength of individuals’ ability to disengage from unattainable 
or costly goals, such that higher scores indicate more adaptive disengagement capacities. Internal 
consistency reliability for the disengagement subscale was satisfactory across the three waves of 
the study (α = .74 to .80). 
The goal reengagement subscale assesses the strength of an individual’s tendency to 
identify, commit to, and start pursuing new goals. Two items each assess identification (e.g. “I 
seek other meaningful goals”), commitment (e.g. “I tell myself that I have a number of other new 
goals to draw on”) and effort (e.g. “I start working on other new goals”), respectively. 
Participants indicate the degree to which each statement describes them using a 5-point Likert 
scale (anchored at 1 = almost always true, 5 = almost never true). The average of ratings across 
items indicates the strength of individuals’ ability to reengage with new, meaningful goals such 
that higher scores indicate more adaptive reengagement capacities. Internal consistency reliability 
for the reengagement subscale was satisfactory across the three waves of the study (α = .90 to 
.92). 
Chapter 4: Results 
Data Integrity 
 Prior to statistical analysis, data were screened according to best practices outlined by 
Kline (2009), Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino (2013), and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) using IBM 
SPSS Statistics, version 22. Multiple imputation of missing data was carried out using Mplus, 
version 6, according to best practices outlined by Múthen and Múthen (1998-2010) and Enders 
(2010). Main statistical analyses were conducted using HLM version 7.01 (Raudenbush et al., 
2011). 
 Thorough inspection of the data revealed no out-of-range scores or errors. Inspection of 
standardized scores revealed 18 cases with scores more than three standard deviations beyond the 
mean on specific variables. None of these cases appeared to belong to a different population than 
the target population of the study. Therefore, in order to reduce their influence on descriptive 
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statistics for the data, each outlier was replaced with the next most extreme score within three 
standard deviations for that variable (Kline, 2009). 
 Descriptive statistics for all study variables are presented in Table 1. The mean and 
standard deviation for the three subscales of the GCOS were comparable to those reported for a 
large (N = 636) sample of undergraduates (Ryan & Deci, 1985a). Similarly, the mean and 
standard deviation for the persistence in goal striving scale were comparable to those reported for 
a sample of young adults (25-39yrs) from a large (N = 3,490) national telephone survey 
conducted in the United States (Wrosch et al., 2000). The mean and standard deviation for goal 
reengagement was similar to that reported for a sample of undergraduates (N = 115; Wrosch et 
al., 2003b). However, for goal disengagement, the mean was lower and the standard deviation 
higher in the sample for the present study than in the sample assessed by Wrosch and colleagues 
in 2003. One possible cause for this discrepancy is the different proportions of males in each 
sample. Only 20.5% of the subjects for the current study were male, whereas 69% of the subjects 
for the Wrosch et al. study were male. Future research may be needed to investigate sex 
differences in goal adjustment tendencies. 
Missing Data. Missing data in the form of attrition, wave nonresponse, and variable 
nonresponse were present across the three waves of the study. The total sample size of 
participants with complete data on baseline measures of dispositional motivation and the outcome 
at each wave declined from baseline (N = 284) to Wave 2 (N = 197) to Wave 3 (N = 169). 
Reporting, analysis, and assessing the implications of missing data were conducted according to 
best practices outlined by Enders (2010; 2011) and Jelicic, Phelps, and Lerner (2009; 2010) for 
handling missing data in longitudinal designs in developmental psychology research.  
 Rubin (1976) proposed a three-part classification of mechanisms of missing data: data 
missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not at random 
(MNAR). It is critical to attempt to understand the precise mechanism of missing data in an 
analysis because the mechanism of missing data determines the most appropriate missing data 
handling technique for that analysis. Data are MCAR when the probability of missing data on a 
given variable is unrelated to the unobserved data (i.e. the “would-be values” Enders, 2010) and 
to any other measured variable in the analysis. Data are MAR when the probability of missing 
data is related to other study variables but not to the missing values themselves. Finally, data are 
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MNAR when the probability of missing data is related to the values of the missing data 
themselves, even after controlling for other variables. 
 Univariate t-tests, which compared participants with and without missing data on a range 
of variables (e.g. all variables included in statistical analyses, various indicators of wellbeing, and 
demographic variables) were conducted to assess the mechanism of missing data in the present 
sample. Results indicated that missingness was unrelated to any variable included in analyses or 
to indicators of wellbeing, age, or subjective socioeconomic status. However, male participants 
were more likely to have missing data on all study variables across the three waves of the study. 
In addition, participants with missing data were more likely to self-identify as Black or North 
American Indian than as White or Asian, to be in their third year of university study, or to have a 
mother with a higher level of education. Because missingness was related to observed study 
variables, the MCAR mechanism was ruled out, leaving MAR and MNAR. It was determined 
that data were unlikely to be missing MNAR because it seemed unlikely that missingness was 
related to the values of the missing data themselves.  Rather, patterns of attrition, wave 
nonresponse, and variable nonresponse suggested that participant fatigue was the most likely 
cause of missing data across waves.  
 When data are MAR, traditional methods for handling missing data (e.g. listwise deletion) 
are inappropriate because the data the researcher has do not represent a random sample of the 
data he or she would have had if all participants had responded fully (Enders, 2010). Instead, a 
state-of-the-art missing data handling technique is required. To date, multiple imputation (MI) 
and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) are the best available methods for handing data that 
are assumed to be MAR (Enders, 2010). Multiple Imputation and MLE frequently yield very 
similar results (e.g. parameter estimates and standard errors), because they make the identical 
assumptions that data are MAR and multivariate normal (Enders, 2011). For the present study, all 
analyses were carried out once under MI and once under Full Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(FIML), the MLE estimation method available in HLM version 7 that also allows comparison of 
model fit using the likelihood ratio test. With the exception of changes in statistical significance 
for a small number of fixed effects, results under FIML were very similar to those obtained under 
MI.1 Hereafter, we report results obtained under MI because MI, unlike FIML in the context of 
                                                        
1 Goodness of fit as assessed by the likelihood ratio test and the direction, statistical significance, 
and patterns of relative magnitude for fixed and random effects were very similar across the four 
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HLM version 7, allowed us to retain cases with missing data on explanatory variables (Enders, 
2010), thereby maximizing sample size and statistical power.  
 The imputation model included 80 variables – the three causality orientations, persistence, 
goal disengagement, and goal reengagement at Waves 1, 2, and 3, various indicators of 
wellbeing, and demographic variables. The selection of these variables capitalized on the richness 
of our longitudinal dataset, as well as the availability of wellbeing variables whose relations to 
causality orientation, goal engagement, and goal adjustment tendencies are well established. The 
imputation model produced a total of 50 imputed datasets, one drawn at every 300th iteration of 
the imputation process. The variables for whom missing data were imputed included explanatory 
variables measured at Wave 1 and outcome variables measured at Waves 1, 2, and 3, enabling us 
to conduct cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of our hypotheses. 
Verification of assumptions. Hierarchical linear modeling of change over time assumes 
that the functional relationship between individual growth trajectories and time is linear (Singer 
& Williett, 2003). Inspection of individual yearlong trajectories confirmed a linear relationship 
between time and each regulation outcome. Hierarchical linear modeling also assumes normality 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
fitted models for each outcome. With respect to goodness of fit, we observed that the chi-squared 
statistic for the likelihood ratio test comparing model 4 to model 3 for the persistence outcome 
was no longer statistically significant under FIML. With respect to random effects, we observed 
no changes in statistical significance or patterns of relative magnitude across models 1-4 for the 
persistence or goal disengagement outcomes. However, whereas the within-persons variance was 
larger than the between-persons variance in intercepts across models for the reengagement 
outcome under MI, this pattern was reversed under FIML. With respect to fixed effects, the 
patterns of direction, statistical significance, and relative magnitude were largely unchanged 
across models for each outcome. We observed that a small number of effects that were 
statistically significant under MI (N = 298) were significant at a trend level or no longer 
significant under FIML. These differences are likely attributable to the substantial reduction in 
sample size for each outcome under FIML. Under MI, which accommodates missing data on 
explanatory variables, we retained the full sample (N = 297). Under FIML, in order to perform a 
conservative comparison of results, we restricted the sample to participants with complete 
outcome data at Wave 1 and Wave 2 for each outcome. This restriction, in addition to FIML’s 
prohibition of cases with missing data on explanatory variables, resulted in a substantial 
reduction in sample size for each outcome (n (persistence) = 195; n (goal disengagement) = 193; 
n (goal reengagement) = 195). Finally, we observed that the direction of a small number of 
effects changed in direction under FIML. However, none of these effects were statistically 




and homoscedasticity of level-1 and level-2 residuals (Singer & Willett, 2003). Visual inspection 
of Q-Q plots and scatterplots of the relationship between the standardized residuals and fitted 
values for both intercepts and slopes revealed no serious violations of these assumptions. 
Multiple imputation assumes that data are MAR and multivariate normal. The case for the 
MAR mechanism has been made above. The assumption of multivariate normality requires that 
all variables and all linear combinations of variables be normally distributed (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Although it is difficult to test this assumption (Sherry & Henson, 2005), 
multivariate normality is more likely when all variables themselves are normally distributed 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). All predictor and outcome variables in the current study were 
normally distributed, making violations of this assumption less likely. 
Statistical Plan 
Hierarchical linear models were fitted to the data to assess the differential main and 
interactive effects of the autonomy, control, and impersonal causality orientations on the initial 
status and rate of change across one academic year for each of the three continuous outcome 
variables – persistence in goal striving, goal disengagement capacities, and goal reengagement 
capacities. A taxonomy of four increasingly complex models was fitted for each outcome 
according to best practices outlined by Singer and Willett (2003). For each outcome, Model 1 
(unconditional means model), which is characterized by the absence of level-1 or level-2 
predictors, partitioned the total variance in the outcome into within- and between-person sources 
and estimated the grand mean for the outcome across the three waves of the study. Model 2 
added the variable Time (e.g. wave) to the level-1 equation to estimate the average initial status 
and yearlong rate of change in the outcome, as well as the extent of individual variability around 
these estimates. Model 3 added the set of three causality orientations to the level-2 equations in 
an effort to explain individual differences in both initial status and rate of change for each 
outcome. A final model added product terms for all possible combinations of causality 
orientations to the level-2 equations to explore possible interactive effects on each outcome 
(Model 4).  Across analyses, level-2 predictors were grand mean-centered to simplify 
interpretation of results and Time was coded so that 0 would represent the baseline assessment 
(e.g. 0 = Wave 1, 1 = Wave 2, 2 = Wave 3; West et al., 2011). Because we wanted to use the 
likelihood ratio test, which compares the deviance statistic of a more complex model to that of a 
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less complex, nested model to assess improvement in model fit, full maximum likelihood 
estimation was chosen as the estimation method (Singer & Willett, 2003). All analyses were 
conducted in HLM version 7.01 (Raudenbush et al., 2011) with robust standard errors. As 
multiple imputation was chosen as the missing data handling technique for the present study, 
analyses were carried out on a complete data set comprising 298 individuals measured on three 
occasions, for a total of 888 observations.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Covariates. Persistence, disengagement, and reengagement baseline scores did not differ 
by sex, race, or year of study, nor did perceived family socio-economic status predict any of these 
goal regulation outcomes. Hence, these potential covariates were excluded from subsequent 
analyses. 
Descriptive statistics, autocorrelations, and within-time correlations. Means, standard 
deviations, and zero-order correlations for all study variables are presented in Table 1. 
Autocorrelations for the three outcome variables for the full sample across time were all 
statistically significant (p < .001) and ranged from .51 to .72 for persistence (median r = .66), 
from .42 to .61 for disengagement (median r = .60), and from .49 to .62 for reengagement 
(median r = .50), suggesting a measure of yearlong stability in each outcome. For all three 
outcomes, the highest autocorrelations were found between Waves 2 and 3, i.e. January and May 
of the same academic year. The lowest autocorrelations were found between the initial 
assessment and Wave 2 for persistence and disengagement. The lowest autocorrelation for 
reengagement was found between baseline assessment and Wave 3. 
Within-time correlations among the outcome measures for the full sample were all 
statistically significant (p < .05) with the exception of the correlation between disengagement and 
reengagement at the initial assessment and Wave 2. Persistence was positively associated with 
reengagement (range in r from .30 to .37) and negatively associated with disengagement (range 
in r from -.28 to -.44).  
Correlations between predictor and outcome variables. Correlations between predictor 
and outcome variables provided preliminary support for proposed hypotheses. The autonomy 
orientation was positively related to persistence (range in r from .26 to .29), the control 
orientation was also positively related to persistence, though to a lesser degree (range in r from 
.07 to .16), and the impersonal orientation was negatively related to persistence (range in r from -
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.34 to -.42), respectively at each of the three waves. With respect to disengagement, the 
autonomy (range in r from -.08 to -.16) and control orientations (range in r from -.01 to -.12) 
were both negatively related to the ability to withdraw effort and commitment from unattainable 
goals, while the impersonal orientation was positively related to this outcome (range in r from .09 
to .13). The autonomy orientation was positively related to reengagement across the three waves 
(range in r from .23 to .29), the control orientation positively but weakly related to reengagement 
(range in r from .09 to .12), and the impersonal orientation was negatively related to 
reengagement at waves 1 and 2 (range in r from -.16 to .06). 
Main Analyses 
Goal engagement. Table 2 summarizes results of multilevel models that were fitted to the 
data to partition and explain yearlong variation in persistence scores. Model 1 (the unconditional 
means model, not shown) indicated that 61.86% of the total variability in persistence across the 
academic year was due to variability between persons, while 38.13% was due to variability 
within persons. A test of the between-persons variability in persistence was statistically 
significant (χ2 (297) = 1800.87, p < .001), indicating the presence of systematic between-persons 
variation in this outcome that was worthy of further exploration.  
Model 2 (the unconditional growth model, not shown) added the variable Time (i.e. wave) 
to the level-1 equation in order to estimate the average growth trajectory (e.g. average initial 
status and average rate of change) in persistence across the academic year, as well as the extent of 
individual differences in growth trajectories, not accounting for the effects of the three causality 
orientations. Results of this model confirmed a statistically significant intercept (t = 97.31, p < 
.001), suggesting that, on average, emerging adults reported non-zero levels of persistence at the 
start of the academic year. In contrast, the analysis revealed a non-significant slope (t = 0.06, p = 
.950), suggesting that, on average, emerging adults’ levels of persistence remained stable across 
the year. Chi-squared tests of the variance components for persistence indicated statistically 
significant variability in participants’ initial status (χ2 = 842.19, p < .001), but not yearlong rate of 
change (χ2 = 280.50), p > .500), suggesting the presence of reliable individual differences in 
participants’ initial status on this outcome. The association between average initial status and 
yearlong rate of change in persistence was positive (r = .78), indicating that individuals who 
began the year with higher levels of persistence increased in this adaptive tendency at a faster rate 
than those who began the year with lower levels of persistence. 
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Model 3 (the intercepts-and-slopes as outcomes model) added the three causality 
orientations to the level-2 equations in order to explain individual differences in initial status and 
yearlong rate of change in persistence. Results of this analysis confirmed statistically significant 
effects of each causality orientation on participants’ initial status in persistence. Consistent with 
our hypotheses, individuals who reported higher autonomy (t = 4.56, p < .001) and higher control 
(t = 2.28, p = .023), also reported higher baseline persistence, but the magnitude of this effect was 
smaller for the control orientation. In contrast, individuals who reported higher impersonal 
orientation demonstrated lower baseline levels of persistence (t = -8.50, p < .001). In contrast, 
and contrary to our expectations, none of the causality orientations had a statistically significant 
effect on participants’ yearlong rate of change in persistence. Overall, the likelihood ratio test 
comparing the lack of fit of Model 3 to the lack of fit of Model 2 indicated that the inclusion of 
the three causality orientations as a set of time-invariant Level 2 predictors improved the fit of the 
model to the data to a statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 114.09, p < .001).  
Finally, in order to explore whether the causality orientations exert interactive effects on 
yearlong growth trajectories in persistence, we added product terms representing all possible 
combinations of the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations to the level-2 equations 
(Model 4). Results of this analysis confirmed a statistically significant interaction between the 
autonomy and control orientations (t = -2.84, p = .005) in predicting participants’ yearlong rate of 
change in persistence. Again, the likelihood ratio test indicated that including the set of three 
interactions among causality orientations improved the fit of the model to the data to a 
statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 17.45, p = .008). 
To probe the nature of the observed interaction, levels of persistence were plotted against 
time separately using one standard deviation above and below the sample mean for predictors as 
reference points (see Figure 1). Consistent with our hypotheses, this analysis revealed that high 
levels of the autonomy orientation reported at baseline were associated with higher absolute 
levels of persistence across the academic year, regardless of participants’ concurrent levels of 
control. However, the highest levels of persistence were observed among participants who 
simultaneously reported high levels of the autonomy and control orientations. In addition, high 
levels of control appeared to exert a protective effect on individuals who reported low autonomy 
at baseline; individuals in this group declined in persistence if they were low in control (t = -2.06, 
p = .041) but increased in persistence if they were high in control (t = 3.16, p = .002).  
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The inclusion of the three product terms resulted in one notable change in the structure of 
the causality orientations’ main effects; controlling for the other causality orientations and their 
interactions, the control orientation, which had no observed effect on rate of change in earlier 
models, had a positive effect on yearlong change in persistence in the final model (t = 2.62, p = 
.009). 
Goal Disengagement. Model 1 (the unconditional means model) indicated that 51.83% 
of the total variability in goal disengagement across the academic year was due to variability 
between persons, while 48.17% was due to variability within persons. A test of the between-
persons variability in disengagement was statistically significant (χ2 (297) = 1332.51, p < .001), 
indicating the presence of systematic between-persons variation in this outcome that was worthy 
of further exploration. 
Model 2 added the variable Time (i.e. wave) to the level-1 equation in order to estimate 
the average growth trajectory (e.g. average initial status and average rate of change) in 
disengagement across the academic year, as well as the extent of individual differences in growth 
trajectories, not accounting for the effects of the three causality orientations. Results of this 
model confirmed a statistically significant intercept (t = 61.79, p < 0.001) and slope (t = 3.66, p < 
.001), suggesting that, on average, emerging adults reported non-zero levels of disengagement at 
the start of the academic year and increased in this capacity from September to May. Chi-squared 
tests of the variance components for disengagement indicated statistically significant variability 
in participants’ initial status (χ2 = 651.68, p < .001), but not yearlong rate of change (χ2 = 276.13, 
p > .500), suggesting the presence of reliable individual differences in participants’ initial status 
on this outcome. The association between average initial status and yearlong rate of change in 
disengagement was positive (r = .88), indicating that individuals who began the year with higher 
levels of disengagement increased in this adaptive tendency at a faster rate than those who began 
the year with lower levels of disengagement. 
Model 3 added the three causality orientations to the level-2 equations in order to explain 
individual differences in initial status and yearlong rate of change in disengagement. Results of 
this analysis confirmed statistically significant effects of each causality orientation on 
participants’ initial status in disengagement. Supporting the hypothesis that the autonomy 
orientation thwarts the ease with which individuals disengage from unattainable goals, 
individuals who reported higher baseline levels of autonomy (t = -2.10, p = .037), also reported 
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lower baseline disengagement capacities. Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals who 
reported higher control (t = -1.95, p = .053) reported lower, while individuals who reported 
higher impersonal orientation reported higher baseline disengagement capacities (t = 2.47, p = 
.014). Regarding yearlong rate of change, only the control orientation exerted a statistically 
significant effect on disengagement capacities. Contrary to our expectations, individuals who 
reported higher control at the start of the academic year demonstrated increases in disengagement 
capacities across the year. Overall, the likelihood ratio test indicated that the inclusion of the 
three causality orientations as a set of time-invariant level-2 predictors improved the fit of the 
model to the data for disengagement to a statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 18.46, p = 
0.005).  
Finally, in order to explore whether the causality orientations exert interactive effects on 
yearlong growth trajectories in disengagement, we added product terms representing all possible 
combinations of the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations to the level-2 equations 
(Model 4). Results of this analysis confirmed a statistically significant interaction between the 
autonomy and impersonal orientations (t = 2.31, p = .021) in predicting participants’ yearlong 
rate of change in disengagement. However, the likelihood ratio test indicated that including the 
set of three interactions among causality orientations did not improve the fit of the model to the 
data to a statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 8.34, p = .214). 
To probe the nature of the observed interaction, levels of disengagement were plotted 
against time using one standard deviation above and below the sample mean for predictors as 
reference points (see Figure 2). This analysis revealed that, among individuals who reported high 
baseline levels of the autonomy orientation, high levels of the impersonal orientation were 
associated with a greater capacity to disengage from unattainable goals, an advantage that was 
maintained across the academic year. Among participants who reported low baseline levels of 
autonomy, high levels of the impersonal orientation were associated with a higher baseline 
capacity for goal disengagement, but not with change in these capacities over the course of the 
year (t = -0.06, p = .949). In contrast, among participants low in autonomy, low levels of the 
impersonal orientation were associated with increases in levels of goal disengagement that 
ultimately reached and surpassed those observed among more highly impersonally oriented 
individuals (t = 4.03, p < .001).  
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Goal Reengagement. Model 1 indicated that 52.06% of the total variability in goal 
reengagement capacities across the academic year was due to variability between persons, while 
47.94% was due to variability within persons. A test of the between-persons variability in 
reengagement was statistically significant (χ2 = 1268.79, p < .001), indicating the presence of 
systematic between-persons variation in this outcome that was worthy of further exploration.  
Model 2 added the variable Time (i.e. wave) to the level-1 equation in order to estimate 
the average growth trajectory (e.g. average initial status and average rate of change) in 
persistence across the academic year, as well as the extent of individual differences in growth 
trajectories, not accounting for the effects of the three causality orientations. Results of this 
model confirmed a statistically significant intercept (t = 77.41, p = .000), suggesting that, on 
average, emerging adults reported non-zero levels of reengagement at the start of the academic 
year. In contrast, the analysis revealed a non-significant slope (t = 1.18, p = .239), suggesting 
that, on average, emerging adults’ levels of reengagement remained stable across the year. Chi-
squared tests of the variance components for reengagement indicated statistically significant 
variability in participants’ initial status (χ2 = 873.04, p < .001), and yearlong rate of change (χ2 = 
398.99, p < .001), indicating the presence of reliable individual differences in both these aspects 
of participants’ yearlong growth trajectories for reengagement. The association between average 
initial status and yearlong rate of change in persistence was negative (r = -0.428), indicating that 
individuals who began the year with higher levels of reengagement increased in this adaptive 
tendency at a slower rate than those who began the year with lower levels of reengagement 
capacities. 
Model 3 added the three causality orientations to the level-2 equations in order to explain 
individual differences in initial status and yearlong rate of change in disengagement. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, the autonomy orientation was positively related (t = 3.21, p = .001), the 
control orientation was unrelated (t = 1.08, p = .281), and the impersonal orientation was 
negatively related (t = -1.74, p = .083) to baseline levels of reengagement capacities. In contrast, 
none of the causality orientations had a statistically significant effect on participants’ yearlong 
rate of change in reengagement, and their inclusion in the model resulted in a negligible decrease 
in individual variability in slopes. Overall, however, the likelihood ratio test indicated that the 
inclusion of the three causality orientations as a set of time-invariant Level 2 predictors improved 
the fit of the model to the data to a statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 35.96, p < .001).  
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Finally, in order to explore whether the causality orientations exert interactive effects on 
yearlong growth trajectories in reengagement, we added product terms representing all possible 
combinations of the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations to the level-2 equations 
(Model 4). Results of this analysis confirmed no statistically significant interactions between 
causality orientations in predicting average intercept or slope for reengagement capacities. 
Examination of the estimated variance components for the model with interactions indicated that 
the set of interactions collectively explained only an additional .11% of the variance in intercepts 
on reappraisals and an additional 3% of the variance in slopes. Overall, the likelihood ratio test 
indicated that including the set of three interactions in the level-2 model did not improve the fit of 
the model to the data for reengagement to a statistically significant degree (χ2 (6) = 2.57, p 
>.500). 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
The current study provides empirical support for the proposition that the quality of 
individuals’ motivation has important implications for both goal engagement and adjustment 
processes in emerging adulthood.  
Regarding goal engagement, emerging adults who reported higher levels of autonomy at 
the dispositional level (e.g. of the autonomy orientation) reported greater behavioral efforts to 
achieve goals at the baseline assessment. This finding is consistent with accumulated evidence 
indicating that concordance between reasons for goals and individuals’ internalized values and 
beliefs and intrinsic interests promotes effort and perseverance across a wide variety of domains 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). As expected, higher levels of the control orientation, which, like the 
autonomy orientation, reflects a tendency to be goal-directed in behavior, were also associated 
with higher levels of persistence at baseline. Given that the control orientation can manifest in the 
adoption of performance-approach or performance-avoidance goals (Koestner & Zuckerman, 
1994) and, in contrast to autonomous motivation, has been shown to promote initial but not 
sustained effort (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998), we expected the strength of this association to be 
attenuated relative to that observed for the autonomy orientation, an hypothesis that was likewise 
supported by the data. In contrast, higher levels of the impersonal orientation were associated 
with lower levels of baseline persistence, confirming the well-replicated finding that a sense of 
personal ineffectance and a belief in the uncontrollability of important outcomes undermines 
behavioral persistence (e.g. Pelletier et al., 2001; Calvo et al., 2010). In sum, these results suggest 
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that the organization of goal pursuit according to values, beliefs, and intrinsic interests 
characterized by the autonomy orientation is an asset for emerging adults in the midst of active 
striving. 
Regarding goal disengagement, participants who reported higher levels of the autonomy 
orientation reported lower levels of disengagement capacities at the baseline assessment, which 
suggests that emerging adults whose motivation for goal pursuits typically reflects deeply self-
endorsed values and intrinsic interests may experience greater difficulty disengaging from these 
goals when withdrawal of effort and commitment is the most adaptive response. This finding 
supports the second of two competing hypotheses we advanced concerning the implications of 
the autonomy orientation for the adaptive regulation of unattainable goals. Highly autonomously 
oriented individuals may, by virtue of the deep connection between their values, interests, and 
aspirations and the consequent importance of their goals, find it relatively more difficult to let go 
of unattainable goals despite the realities of insufficient skills, missed developmental deadlines, 
or competing demands for resources.  
This finding represents a paradox for today’s emerging adults, who are often encouraged 
to pursue dreams and identify passions as the surest route to success, fulfillment, and wellbeing 
in adulthood. Although social scientists have not, to date, launched a systematic investigation of 
this message – e.g. its pervasiveness, influence, and veracity – its utility has been debated in the 
popular press for a decade (for a recent example, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-
andestic/should-we-encourage-our-k_b_6037148.html). Exhorted to find and pursue a passion, 
emerging adults who are highly autonomously oriented may, ironically, be ill-equipped to 
respond adaptively to the inevitable failures inherent in making the transition to competitive, 
demanding environments such as the university or market contexts.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, higher levels of the control orientation were also 
associated with lower self-reported disengagement capacities at baseline, suggesting that 
individuals who demonstrate a strong tendency to organize behavior according to environmental 
cues and contingencies may also experience difficulty disengaging from unattainable goals. A 
possible explanation for this finding is that high levels of the control orientation reflect 
contingent self-esteem, or self-worth that is dependent on success in important domains (Deci & 
Ryan, 1995; Hodgins et al., 2007). When success is a prerequisite for self-esteem, unattainable 
goals present a serious threat to an individual’s sense of self-worth, a threat that highly controlled 
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individuals may attempt to allay by persisting in futile efforts or remaining psychologically 
committed to goals.  
Also consistent with our hypotheses, higher levels of the impersonal orientation were 
associated with higher levels of disengagement capacities at the baseline assessment, suggesting 
that the tendency to focus on personal ineffectance and the uncontrollability of life outcomes may 
support individuals in circumstances where withdrawal of effort and commitment is the most 
adaptive response. This finding provides support for our hypothesis that individuals who more 
readily accept that important life outcomes may be, at least at times, beyond their control should 
have an easier time disengaging from unattainable goals. One possible mechanism for this effect 
may be the experience of depressive symptoms and low mood, which both theoretical (e.g. 
Nesse, 2000) and empirical evidence (e.g. Wrosch & Miller, 2009) suggest promote adaptive 
disengagement.  
Regarding goal reengagement, higher levels of the autonomy orientation were 
associated with greater reengagement capacities at baseline, suggesting that individuals who 
typically organize goal pursuit around internalized and intrinsic motivation may find it easier to 
identify, commit to, and commence pursuit of new goals. This relative facility with 
reengagement, we argue, may have its roots in the greater integration in personality (Koestner et 
al., 1992) and tendency to seek out information and actively explore possibilities before making 
identity commitments (Soenens et al., 2005) observed among more autonomously oriented 
emerging adults. As we have noted, although typically related to benefits for health and 
wellbeing, reengagement may represent a double-edged sword depending on a) whether or not an 
individual has disengaged and b) the nature of the alternative goal he or she selects, given life 
circumstances (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). Thus, it remains to be seen whether a strong 
autonomy orientation promotes adaptive reengagement tendencies or poses risks for 
overcommitment and depletion. Indeed, this relationship may depend on factors independent 
from causality orientation and situation-specific motivation.  
Also consistent with our hypotheses, higher levels of the control orientation were weakly 
related to reengagement capacities at baseline. The fact that the control orientation was positively 
associated with persistence but weakly associated with reengagement points to an important 
distinction; while control may support the engagement of individuals who have already selected 
and committed to a goal, it may thwart attempts to identify and commit to an alternative goal 
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following disengagement. Given that the control orientation is characterized by reliance on 
external cues, individuals with high levels of this orientation may be at a loss following 
disengagement if the environment does not provide clear directives with clear contingencies for 
reinvestment. This explanation is consistent with the insight, which is beginning to appear more 
frequently in the SDT literature, that the effects of controlled motivation may be difficult to 
predict due to the reliance of controlled individuals on environmental directives (Schwartz et al., 
2005).  
Finally, again consistent with our hypotheses, higher levels of the impersonal orientation 
were negatively related to reengagement capacities at baseline. This finding is aligned with Deci 
& Ryan’s (1985a) contention that impersonally oriented individuals seek out and are sensitive to 
signs of incompetence and uncontrollability in regulatory events. When these events are, indeed, 
objective failures, we argue that individuals with a strong impersonal orientation will tend to 
focus on failure at the expense of moving forward with new goals. 
In sum, results of the current study provide empirical support for all of our hypotheses 
concerning the differential main effects of causality orientations on participants’ absolute levels 
of goal engagement and adjustment capacities, suggesting that SDT is a relevant and useful 
framework for understanding not only adaptive striving, but also adaptive responses to failure 
and frustration. Of particular interest was our finding that the autonomy orientation appears to be 
associated with lower levels of disengagement capacities among emerging adults, a finding that 
challenges the accepted wisdom that autonomy is an unqualified asset in the context of goal 
pursuit.   
Only one causality orientation exerted a statistically significant effect on yearlong rate of 
change in a goal regulation outcome. Contrary to our hypotheses and to results concerning 
participants’ baseline status, the control orientation predicted increases in disengagement 
capacities over the course of the academic year. It is possible that individuals with higher levels 
of the control orientation mature in their capacity to disengage from unattainable goals because 
their goals reflect internal and external pressure rather than self-endorsement. The opportunity to 
cast off goals that are experienced as sources of pressure may outweigh the threat to contingent 
self-esteem that, we propose, is inherent in admitting failure for such individuals. Which aspect 
of unattainable goals is more salient in a given context may depend on unmeasured factors such 
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as goal importance, a priori investment of resources, and level of peer, family, and societal 
pressure to achieve the goal.  
Finally, although the data did not support hypotheses concerning the main effects of 
causality orientations on yearlong changes in goal regulation tendencies, results of exploratory 
analyses did confirm the presence of statistically significant interactive effects among causality 
orientations on yearlong rate of change in two out of three goal regulation outcomes. The specific 
nature of these interactions suggests that balance among, or the capacity to draw flexibly upon 
the different qualities of motivation that can exist within individuals may be an asset in terms of 
both goal engagement and adjustment.  
Regarding the joint effect of the autonomy and control orientations on yearlong changes 
in persistence, simple slopes analysis (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) indicated that, relative to 
low levels of autonomy, high levels of the autonomy orientation were, as expected, an asset 
supporting higher overall levels of persistence across the year. However, the control orientation 
appeared to exert adaptive effects as well, boosting the overall level of persistence among 
emerging adults who are already high in autonomy and supporting growth in persistence among 
those who are typically less self-determined in their goal pursuit. These results suggest that 
individuals who can balance goal pursuits organized around deeply internalized values and 
intrinsic interests with sensitivity and responsiveness to the external academic and social 
demands of the university context may be best equipped to self-regulate effectively while striving 
during this phase of their lives.  
Regarding the joint effect of the autonomy and impersonal orientations on yearlong 
changes in goal disengagement capacities, simple slopes analysis indicated that, among highly 
autonomously oriented individuals, high levels of the impersonal orientation were associated with 
greater, and low levels of the impersonal orientation with lower absolute levels of disengagement 
capacities across the academic year. This interaction effect, like that of the autonomy and control 
orientations on persistence, again suggests that a degree of balance among motivational styles 
may be an asset for self-regulation in goal pursuit among emerging adults. Even the impersonal 
orientation, though generally shown to be deleterious for striving, may play an adaptive role 
when it helps emerging adults to withdraw effort and commitment at the appropriate time. The 
results of the current study indicate that the stronger an individual’s autonomy orientation, the 
more difficult it may be for that individual to respond adaptively to unattainable goals. However, 
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when such individuals also have the capacity to accept that they may lack skill and competence in 
certain areas and understand that certain outcomes may be beyond their control (e.g. draw on the 
impersonal orientation), they may be more likely to disengage, sparing them from exposure to 
repeated failure and freeing their resources, potentially, for meaningful reengagement in 
alternative goals. 
Among less autonomously oriented individuals, high levels of the impersonal orientation 
were again associated with higher baseline disengagement capacities, which supports our 
hypothesis that the impersonal orientation supports disengagement processes in general. 
However, within this group, it was low levels of the impersonal orientation that were associated 
with yearlong increases in goal disengagement capacities. At first glance, this finding is difficult 
to interpret because low levels of the impersonal orientation are theoretically less supportive of 
disengagement. One possible interpretation is that low levels of the autonomy orientation may 
function similarly to high levels of the impersonal orientation and support growth in 
disengagement even when the impersonal orientation is less dominant. While the impersonal 
orientation may help individuals to disengage through beliefs about uncontrollability and 
personal ineffectance, low levels of the autonomy orientation may support increases in 
disengagement capacities through low levels of internalization and consequently low importance 
of personal goals. Simply put, less self-determined individuals may have an easier time with 
disengagement because they tend to care less about the goals they are pursuing. These intriguing 
findings justify the further development of theory and empirical questions around the joint effects 
of causality orientations on the development of goal regulation capacities in emerging adulthood. 
Strengths and Limitations 
Although all study hypotheses vis-à-vis participants’ initial status in goal engagement, 
disengagement, and reengagement capacities were supported by the data, we did not observe the 
expected differential effects of causality orientations on yearlong changes in goal regulation 
outcomes. Three aspects of our study design may have limited our ability to observe longitudinal 
effects of causality orientations on goal regulation outcomes. First, a single academic year may 
have been insufficient to capture the effects of causality orientations on the development of these 
outcomes. Given the gradual nature of personality change (MacAdams & Olsen, 2010), a longer 
period – for example, three or four years of university study – may be more appropriate for the 
study of these putative effects. Second, while hierarchical linear modeling allowed us to estimate 
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effects of causality orientations on the linear rate of change for each outcome across the entire 
academic year, alternative statistical modeling approaches to the analysis of change over time 
may have revealed effects on more nuanced patterns of change. For example, a cross-lagged 
panel design within the structural equation modeling framework would have allowed us to test 
whether causality orientations exerted main or interactive effects on a constant vs. time-varying 
rate of change in goal regulation capacities from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (e.g. first semester and winter 
holiday), or from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (e.g. within the second academic semester only). Third, the 
relatively equal distribution of students across four years of university study limited our ability to 
test hypotheses in subsamples of students whose experiences vis-à-vis striving and the experience 
of unattainable goals may be qualitatively different given their context. Students enrolled in their 
first year of university study, for example, likely experience a greater transition in terms of roles 
and the experience of unattainable goals than students in any other year. Likewise, students 
enrolled in their final year may need to face the fact that long-term goals, such as admission to 
graduate and professional schools or positioning oneself effectively to work in competitive 
industries, have not been achieved. Future research on the effects of causality orientations on the 
development of goal engagement and adjustment capacities should test hypotheses over 
developmentally meaningful expanses of time, such as a three or four year degree, and among 
subsamples in which change in goal regulation at the personality level is most likely to occur, 
such as individuals transitioning into or out of university or into the workforce. 
 The current study has several limitations. First, we did not sample emerging adults who 
are not enrolled in university. Thus, results and conclusions may not generalize to individuals 
who are working, traveling, volunteering, or spending time deciding upon their future paths.  
 Second, we operationalized goal engagement via a measure of persistence in goal striving, 
which, while a central aspect of engagement across major theories of developmental regulation, is 
by no means synonymous with the construct. Indeed, a recent effort to integrate approaches to the 
regulation of goals across the life course identified seven distinct and overlapping goal 
engagement processes (Haase et al., 2013).  It is therefore possible that the differential 
associations between the autonomy, control, and impersonal orientations with goal engagement 




 Third, the current study does not address the issue of different profiles in goal adjustment 
capacities. Goal adjustment theory suggests that different profiles, or sequences, of 
disengagement and reengagement are more or less adaptive depending on individuals’ life 
circumstances (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013). In general, individuals who disengage from 
unattainable goals and then reengage in meaningful alternatives are hypothesized to demonstrate 
the most adaptive outcomes, so long as new goals do not spread resources too thin. Specifically, 
among younger adults, reengagement is considered particularly important when disengagement 
capacities are low; because younger adults have relatively greater opportunities for alternative 
goal pursuit and relatively few obligations, reengagement may buffer the negative consequences 
of difficulty with disengagement. On the other hand, it may be more beneficial to remain 
committed to an unfeasible goal in contexts with relatively small alternative opportunities, such 
as older adulthood, in order to protect an individual’s sense of meaning and purpose in life. As it 
is not disengagement and reengagement in isolation, but in different combinations made more or 
less adaptive by different circumstances, that determine health and wellbeing in the wake of 
experiencing an unattainable goal, a more rigorous test of the relevance of self-determination 
theory for explaining differences in goal adjustment capacities would include predictions not only 
about disengagement and reengagement per se, but in relevant combinations. For example, while 
the impersonal orientation may be more important for ease of disengagement, the autonomy 
orientation may be more important for ease of reengagement, suggesting again that individuals 
who are able to draw flexibly on different motivational orientations may show the most adaptive 
responses to unattainable goals. 
The current study has several notable strengths. To our knowledge, it represents the first 
attempt to apply SDT’s theoretical framework of motivation at the dispositional level to the 
phenomenon of unattainable goals and adaptive responses (e.g. goal disengagement and 
reengagement) to failure and frustrated aspirations. Second, it advances knowledge of goal 
adjustment processes by identifying factors that may support the development of disengagement 
and reengagement capacities. Third, the current study advances research on motivational 
processes that may contribute to normative growth in wellbeing during emerging adulthood. In 
the fifteen years since Arnett coined the term EA to describe this new period of development in 
Western, industrialized societies, descriptive research on its demographic features and the 
subjective experiences of emerging adults in varied cultural contexts has proliferated. The current 
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study responds to the need to advance research on EA beyond questions of “what” to questions of 
“how” (Shulman & Nurmi, 2010a) – questions about the factors that support growth and 
maturation during an exploratory and often unstable phase (Arnett, 2004). 
 
Implications for future research 
To address the limitations and build on the strengths cited above, future research applying 
SDT’s theoretical framework to the phenomenon of unattainable goals should a) test hypotheses 
in competing samples of university-enrolled vs. non-university enrolled emerging adults to 
explore whether contextual differences within emerging adulthood contribute to different patterns 
of motivation and goal regulation, b) develop and test hypotheses concerning the impact of 
dispositional motivational orientation on more or less adaptive profiles of goal disengagement 
and reengagement, c) test hypotheses concerning change in dispositional characteristics over a 
longer period of time in order to maximize the likelihood of observing putative longitudinal 
effects and d) test hypotheses among individuals who are most likely to be experiencing or 
anticipating role transition, e.g. emerging adults making the transition to or out of university or to 
the job market.  
Results of the current study, which investigated hypotheses at the dispositional level for 
both motivational predictors and goal regulation outcomes, point to the need for research efforts 
aimed at identifying the mechanisms through which causality orientations may exert distal effects 
on the development of goal engagement and adjustment capacities. Wrosch and colleagues have 
suggested that the repeated regulation of specific goals, e.g. learning the benefits of 
disengagement and reengagement through experience over time, may be a proximal influence on 
the development of goal adjustment capacities (Mens, Wrosch, & Scheier, 2014). Likewise, SDT 
researchers have shown that causality orientations predict the quality of motivation for specific 
goals. Therefore, the next step in understanding the relation of motivation to the full spectrum of 
goal regulation processes is the development of longitudinal models that specify links between 
motivational orientation, motivation for specific goals, regulation of specific goals, and finally, 
changes in goal regulation capacities. Such models should also test potential moderators of these 
effects. For example, research in the SDT framework has demonstrated that autonomy support – 
the experience of being offered choice, a clear rationale for directives, and indications that one’s 
perspective is understood and valued by authority figures and institutions – and motivation at the 
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dispositional level (e.g. causality orientation) exert additive effects on motivation in specific 
situations (Gillet et al., 2013). Likewise, Wrosch and colleagues have proposed various factors 
that may facilitate or hinder goal disengagement and reengagement, including depressive 
symptoms and aspects of personality such as optimism and the experience of positive affective 
states (Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013) and biographical or environment factors, such as the 
amount of investment one has already made in a goal (e.g. “sunk cost”) and the amount of peer, 
family, and societal pressure one experiences vis-à-vis goal achievement (Wrosch et al., 2003a).  
Self-determination theory is a theory of human motivation that emphasizes intrinsic 
human tendencies to behave in healthy, effective ways (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Results from the 
current study indicate that SDT’s theoretical framework can be usefully extended to predict 
healthy, effective behavior among emerging adults not only in the midst of their active goal 
pursuit, but also in the face of the failures, frustrations, and thwarted aspirations that are 
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Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between study variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. GE (T1)             
2. GE (T2) .509**            
3. GE (T3) .659** .723**           
4. GD (T1) -.370** -.310** -.374**          
5. GD (T2) -.178** -.279** -.286** .421**         
6. GD (T3) -.375** -.234** -.442** .598** .607**        
7. GR (T1) .303** .225** .324** .067 .058 -.025       
8. GR (T2) .356** .376** .454** -.099 .079 -.023 .501**      
9. GR (T3) .238** .314** .322** -.013 .038 .111 .486** .624**     
10. AUT (T1) .292** .260** .260** -.158** -.086 -.078 .232** .250** .291**    
11. CON (T1) .068 .074 .160** -.118* -.029 -.007 .095 .091 .120* .214**   
12. IMP (T1) -.397** -.420** -.340** .128* .099 .092 -.082 -.156 .058 -.098 .257**  
























Note. GE = Goal engagement; GD = Goal disengagement subscale of the Goal Adjustment Scale (GAS); GR = Goal reengagement subscale of the GAS; AUT = 
Autonomy subscale of the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS); CON = Control subscale of the GCOS; IMP = Impersonal subscale of the GCOS; T1 = 
Time 1; T2 = Time 2; T3 = Time 3;  






Multilevel modeling analyses predicting initial status and rate of change in persistence from causality orientations 
      Model 3   Model 4  
Fixed Effects  Parameter  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Initial Status, 
π0i 
 Intercept  γ00  3.08 ** 0.03  3.06 ** 0.03 
  Aut  γ01  0.22 ** 0.05  0.23** 0.05 
  Con  γ02  0.10 ** 0.04  0.08 * 0.04 
  Imp  γ03  -0.28 * 0.03  -0.28 ** 0.03 
  AutxCon  γ04     0.12 0.08 
  AutxImp  γ05     -0.01 0.06 
  ConxImp  γ06     0.04 0.04 
           
Rate of 
change, π2i 
 Intercept  γ10  0.00 0.01  0.02 0.01 
  Aut  γ11  -0.03 0.03  -0.04 0.03 
  Con  γ12  0.04 + 0.02  0.06 ** 0.02 
  Imp  γ13  0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02 
  AutxCon  γ14     -0.11 ** 0.04 
  AutxImp  γ15     -0.03 0.03 
  ConxImp  γ16     -0.04 0.03 
           
Variance Components 
       SD    
Level 1  Within-person  2  0.13 0.35  0.12 0.35 
Level 2  In initial status  00  0.12** 0.34  0.12** 0.34 
  In rate of change  10  0.00 0.03  0.00 0.03 
  Covariancea    0.92   0.94  
           
Goodness of Fit         
  
- 2 log likelihood 
(FIML) b 
   1116.12**   1098.67**  
 
Note. Aut = Autonomy Subscale of the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS); Con = Control Subscale of the 
GCOS; Imp = Impersonal Subscale of the GCOS.  
a Covariance of 00 and 10, expressed as a correlation. 
b “Deviance” statistic; summarizes lack of fit of model to data. 
 




Multilevel modeling analyses predicting initial status and rate of change in goal disengagement capacities from 
causality orientations 
      Model 3   Model 4  
Fixed Effects  Parameter  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Initial Status, 
π0i 
 Intercept  γ00  2.55** 0.04  2.54** 0.04 
  Aut  γ01  -0.14* 0.07  -0.13+ 0.06 
  Con  γ02  -0.13+ 0.07  -0.14* 0.04 
  Imp  γ03  0.13* 0.05  0.13* 0.05 
  AutxCon  γ04     0.07 0.11 
  AutxImp  γ05     0.04 0.08 
  ConxImp  γ06     0.01 0.05 
           
Rate of 
change, π2i 
 Intercept  γ10  0.08** 0.02  0.09** 0.02 
  Aut  γ11  0.03 0.03  0.03 0.03 
  Con  γ12  0.06* 0.03  0.07* 0.03 
  Imp  γ13  -0.03 0.03  -0.03 0.03 
  AutxCon  γ14     -0.07 0.05 
  AutxImp  γ15     0.10* 0.04 
  ConxImp  γ16     -0.04 0.03 
           
Variance Components 
       SD    
Level 1  Within-person  2  0.2737 0.52  0.2713 0.52 
Level 2  In initial status  00  0.2649** 0.51  0.2668** 0.52 
  In rate of change  10  0.0028 0.05  0.0024 0.05 
  Covariancea    0.929   0.923  
           
Goodness of Fit          
  
- 2 log likelihood 
(FIML) b 
   1828.75**   1820.42  
 
Note. Aut = Autonomy Subscale of the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS); Con = Control Subscale of the 
GCOS; Imp = Impersonal Subscale of the GCOS.  
a Covariance of 00 and 10, expressed as a correlation. 
b “Deviance” statistic; summarizes lack of fit of model to data. 
 




Multilevel modeling analyses predicting initial status and rate of change in goal reengagement capacities from 
causality orientations 
      Model 3   Model 4  
Fixed Effects  Parameter  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Initial Status, 
π0i 
 Intercept  γ00  3.54** 0.04  3.52** 0.05 
  Aut  γ01  0.28** 0.09  0.28** 0.09 
  Con  γ02  0.09 0.08  0.08 0.08 
  Imp  γ03  -0.10+ 0.06  -0.09 0.03 
  AutxCon  γ04     0.07 0.14 
  AutxImp  γ05     -0.11 0.10 
  ConxImp  γ06     0.04 0.09 
           
Rate of 
change, π2i 
 Intercept  γ10  0.03 0.02  0.04+ 0.02 
  Aut  γ11  0.03 0.04  0.02 0.05 
  Con  γ12  -0.00 0.04  0.01 0.04 
  Imp  γ13  0.02 0.03  0.01 0.03 
  AutxCon  γ14     -0.06 0.08 
  AutxImp  γ15     0.04 0.06 
  ConxImp  γ16     -0.03 0.04 
           
Variance Components 
       SD    
Level 1  Within-person  2  0.25 0.50  0.25 0.50 
Level 2  In initial status  00  0.367** 0.61  0.364** 0.60 
  In rate of change  10  0.0428** 0.21  0.0417 ** 0.20 
  Covariancea    0.92   0.94  
           
Goodness of Fit          
  
- 2 log likelihood 
(FIML) b 
   1844.53**   1841.96  
 
Note. Aut = Autonomy Subscale of the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS); Con = Control Subscale of the 
GCOS; Imp = Impersonal Subscale of the GCOS.  
a Covariance of 00 and 10, expressed as a correlation. 
b “Deviance” statistic; summarizes lack of fit of model to data. 
 
















































Figure 1: Associations between time and persistence at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of 
the autonomy orientation separately for participants who reported low (-1 SD) vs. high (+1 SD) 





Figure 2: Associations between time and goal disengagement capacities at low (-1 SD) and high 
(+1 SD) levels of the impersonal orientation separately for participants who reported low (-1 SD) 
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